Encyclopædia Britannica defines democratization as, plainly, “[a] process through which a political regime becomes democratic…the period between the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and the conclusion of the first democratic national elections”. Bruce Jentleson in his book American Foreign Policy agrees with Encyclopædia Britannica in their assertion that democratization comes in waves, documenting the first wave as being from 1776 to 1945, which was a slow march to democracy and saw the rise of communism and fascism: the second wave from 1945 to 1964 saw the, “restoration of democracy to much of Western Europe, the shift from military to democratic governments in many Latin American countries, and the establishment of democracy in a number of newly independent African states…By 1964, though, key Latin American countries underwent military coups…according to its [United States] “ABC” strategy (anything but communism): the third wave from 1974 to 1986 in which various countries overthrew dictatorships and embraced democracy while others (like Pakistan) endured military coups: the fourth and final wave, beginning in 1989, many countries went through democratization due to the fall of the Soviet Union while some ex-Soviet states and Russia underwent, “reversals of democracy”. Democratization is essentially the time between a revolution or coup and the transition towards a democratic society for a country. However, one question that remains with this type of policy is, is it a good idea for the United States to take in countries to varying different political, social, and economic desires in the globe?
This process does have some validity and benefit in terms of foreign policy. However, I feel that this policy and the idea of democratization has been misused and abused by specific administrations, with their usages of covert action to promote democracy being built upon fears and biases and faulty intelligence and interpretation. U.S. covert action and involvement in moving or pushing nations towards a democratic government has often had very adverse effects and, in the end, does not promote a government that falls in line with a liberal democratic worldview.
One of the best examples of how this democratization policy does not work is with Guatemala in 1954. Guatemala, since their independence from Spain in the mid-1800’s, had largely been a stable government, though ruled through military dictatorships. President Juan José Arévalo was elected in Guatemala’s first free election in 1945 and began following a democratic socialist set of policies, which eventually culminated with Decree 900 (though this was performed by his successor, Jacobo Árbenz), a land reappropriation plan designed to give back land to the actual Guatemalans who deservedly owned the land instead of foreign companies. One of the largest companies to hold land in Guatemala was the Boston-based United Fruit Company, which controlled, “550,000 acres…[with] a total of 209,842 acres being uncultivated [85 percent of the total land held under UFC]” and had a monopoly on the electric and rail systems of the country. Eventually, due to UFC’s very probable loss of power and profits within the nation, the company notifies the U.S. government that Guatemala is possible engaging in Communist land reforms and is verging politically to Communism. This resulted in the State Department and the CIA to begin planning a covert operation to overthrow the Árbenz regime, based upon a key misinterpretation of the president’s land reform policy and faulty intelligence gained through poor sources. The coup was accomplished in 1954, with a conservative, anti-Communist Colonel taking command of the government. Since then, there has not been a stable government in Guatemala, with coups, civil wars, war crimes, and ethnic warfare being a common presence since 1954; the U.S. supported many of these leaders as well, with Efraín Ríos Montt being an example of the American supported brutality and barbary. Since 2000, the country has become more democratic, but are still facing many human security troubles and house one of “the most sophisticated and dangerous,” criminal organizations in Latin America. Such democratization processes in Guatemala did not work out in the long run and has taken a very long time in getting to a place even remotely relatable to a democratic government, as well as probably costing more civilian lives than it would have under Árbenz’s rule.
Another example could be found in Vietnam. When it became clear that South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, would be unable to hold on to power (due to his repression of Buddhists and corrupt activities), the U.S. supported a coup against Diem. This coup, while it certainly removed an unpopular leader, eventually had negative consequences for both the United States and the Vietnamese living in the South. As President Kennedy had predicted, removing Diem resulted in political instability throughout South Vietnam, resulting in junta after junta, with each government being even more unstable than the last. While the process of democratization eventually resulted in South Vietnam’s new president, Nguyen Van Thieu, taking power, his presidency was marred by political and public corruption and was fully dependent upon U.S. military and economic aid, essentially being seen as a subordinate to the American government, even becoming somewhat despotic and tyrannical near the end of his rule in 1974 and 1975. Again, democratization did not work in its intended form in South Vietnam. In both of these cases, democratization brought about more destabilization and instability in these troubled regions than there had been before. The cases against U.S. democratization abroad are also numerous, with examples being found in Chile’s 1973 coup, Iran’s 1953 coup, the aftermath of the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Banana Wars of Latin America conducted under Wilson and later presidents, and the Bolivian 1971 coup under Hugo Banzer, to name a few (though there are hundreds more examples).
However, there are a few exceptions to this, when U.S. democratization did work out for the better and did improve the quality of life for some countries. One of the best examples I can find is U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989. It is without a doubt that Manuel Noriega was a criminal and despot of the highest order, manipulating domestic policies to suit his own needs, creating deals with criminal organizations to traffic drugs to the U.S. for profit, and possibly even having his own commander in chief assassinated. From 1969 until the late 1980’s as well, he was an asset and on the payroll of the U.S. military and the CIA. The U.S. eventually severed ties with Noriega (far too late than they should have really) upon his 1988 indictments by two grand juries in Miami and Tampa on drug trafficking charges and planned an invasion of the Central American country following the murder of a Marine and assaults upon U.S. military personnel. Since the removal of Noriega from Panama, there were initial problems in government and leadership, dealing with the dissolution of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and corruption, however, entering the new millennium, the government was able to solve most of these problems and turn the country into a functioning democracy that is quite stable and improving socially, economically, and politically. While the motivation for U.S. intervention was not to create a democracy, the end result is that the removal of Noriega did assist in turning Panama into a democracy.
In the end, democratization has a mixed record. In my view, there are many examples in which America’s attempts at democratization resulted in negative effects for the countries themselves and enmeshed the U.S. further into a conflict that was, in the long run, marred by war crimes, abuses, and loss of life on every side. I think democratization in its intent is a viable process and has the ability to legitimately work and improve the country in which the U.S. is involved. However, what must be done to determine if democratization will work is to have the best possible intelligence upon a situation, person, and incident; going into a country that has repeatedly made statements against Communism (like Guatemala) has had disastrous consequences for the country. Democratization, when it is utilized with the desire of creating a country that follows democratic processes without outside influence, can be successful, however, I feel it is most often utilized by the U.S. with ulterior motivations, meant to either deter the enemy or serve as a quick fix to a large and long-term problem. Having ulterior motivations when employing a tactic that is supposed to bring democracy to a foreign country is not a good policy and allows for the tactic to quickly become applied for the wrong purpose.
In removing these potential ulterior motivations by U.S. officials and policymakers in democratization, it would be quite difficult to try and remove these personal sentiments and ulterior motives from democratization policies, possibly impossible to try and do. It would, however, require the placing of officials (both civilian and military) with as little ulterior motives as possible. Really, probably the only way I could conceive of this occurring is if the chief executive gathered people around him or her who did not have agendas, desires for wars or conflicts with fellow countries, or have personal profits as a leading factor in becoming entrenched in a country. In terms of removing public suspicions about this, I would argue that being open and aware of the optics of any given situation is essential. Having a good working and professional relationship with the media also is a great benefit to military operations successes and in getting the public to better know their commanders; for example, Gen. Creighton Abrams (Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), Gen. David Petraeus (Commander of the International Security Assistance Force), and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf (Commander of U.S. Central Command) were all very fond of the media and knew their power which is why these commanders were so open to the media and reporters. Having this type of relationship with the media will allow the public to see how the military commander conducts themselves. Really, the best way to prevent ulterior motives from becoming commonplace in government is to hire the persons who can best perform the mission at hand while not being subjected to their own personal biases, motivations, or desires for money or power.
